PRINS is essentially a TLS hop-by-hop method with an additional Application Security Layer (ALS), negotiated end-to-end between mobile operators using the N32c protocol. This in itself introduces unnecessary overhead and even scalability problems in case of TLS-only connections. 

While the handling of TLS certificates could be simplified (same as TLS hop-by-hop without ALS), there is the added complexity of agreeing on a suitable security policy for each of the 5000+ information elements with each roaming partner. And this may depend on whatever service the roaming partner has outsourced to his international IPX carrier. 

Furthermore, the mobile operator must negotiate cryptographical material with his international IPX provider out-of-band and provide public keys to each roaming partner for patch verification. 

A simpler approach would be to avoid any patching. However, by doing this, the economic viability of this method would be even more restricted.  

While PRINS arguably prevents intermediates from making changes unnoticed, and can conceal sensitive information from them, the question remains whether this aligns with the industry’s needs, or whether it generates too much overhead for too little gain.

The reality is that PRINS is less secure than TLS-only, as any security policy compromises the integrity of an otherwise strictly closed end-to-end pipe.

The inability to visually trace patches applied by IPX carriers complicates the process for the originating operator, leading to an increased dependency on audit trails for issue resolution and dispute management. Some may question then the actual gains of this model in operational terms.